RELEVANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES: EVALUATION OF THE INTERPRETATIONAL FUNCTIONALITY IN THE LIGHT OF PROPERTY OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION

Aligning with Bruce Ackerman’s theory, the August Offer and the events that followed, culminating in the formation of the constituent assembly and drafting of the Indian constitution, marked a constitutional moment, with the Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD) forming its legacy. Particularly, in the light of the ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’ of allowing unelected judges to subject the policy decisions of democratically elected legislators and even invalidate them, CAD gains relevance as a tool with which judges may establish at least notional accountability. Even though the criticism of ‘unelected’ may seem to taint the constituent assembly in the quest for accountability, the lack of political ill-wills or motives and the particularly ensured diversity of the body favours the idea of an accrued popular will designating accountability to the forum. This was the very argument Dr. Ambedkar put forth to justify the composition of the assembly and in placing inherent and implied limitations in bringing amendments, thereby calling for adherence to the intentions of its makers.
This is where the problem that the paper seeks to address arises. In constitutional interpretations, one often comes across the debate on originalism and non-originalism. While adherence to originalism can effectively address the counter-majoritarian difficulty, thus making the judges eligible to enjoy accountability, a path of non-originalism may provide pragmatic solutions. Hence, the interpretational functionality of CAD forms the very crux of this debate. The question here is, to what extent CAD be accounted as relevant in interpreting the constitutional provisions? Can there be departures, and if yes, are there any circumscribing limits? The paper makes an evaluation of this dilemma in the light of the recent decision in Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, particularly the interpretational exercise of ‘material resources’ as envisaged within Art. 39(b) of the Constitution. The analysis focuses on the blurring distinctions of intentionalism and pragmatism as seen in the matter.
The attempt here is not to decipher the ‘right’ method of interpreting the constitution, rather is to expose the multifarious possibilities in doing that and to examine how the differing approaches may realign interpretations. After all, what purpose does servility to theoretical conjectures serve to justice when such postulates are envisioned only for guiding certainty and clarity and not to serve as roadblocks in deviant interpretations necessitated by change!
Keywords: Interpretation of constitution, Art. 39(b), textualism, pragmatism, CAD